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A. The Assessment of Damages for delict in South African and 
German Law, with special regard to loss of use and 
fraudulent misrepresentation inducing a contract 
I. Introduction 
This thesis deals with the question of how the existence and 
extent of damage, as well as well the proper amount of damages, 
· are to be determined in the case of delict. To answer this 
question most legal systems have devoloped different rules and 
principles which do work satisfactorily in most cases. There are, 
however, certain cases in which the basic principles do not lead 
to satisfying results. In these cases courts often have a problem 
establishing their ,decision, as neither basic legal principles nor 
legal theory are able to provide a satisfying solution. 
One such. case is whether and to what extent damages may be 
recovered for the loss of use of property. Another is the 
assessment of damages in cases where intentional 
misrepresentation has induced a contract. In order to find a 
satisfying solution it is often helpful to note the legal position in a 
comparable legal system. For the purposes of this thesis I have 
decided to compare the solutions offered by South African and 
German law. 
In discussing the problem comprehensivly, first the assessment of 
patrimonial loss in general will be discussed. For this it is 
essential to find a working definition of the terms "damage" and 
"patrimonial-loss". Secondly, the basic principles of the 
assessment of damages in the case of damage to property will be 
explained. Finally, the assessment of damages in•·the context of 
loss of use and fraudulent misrepresentation will be referred to. 
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II. The Assessment of patrimonial Joss in general 
1. Definitions 
a) damage 
Under both South African and German law finding a satisfying 
definition of the term damage has been difficult. According to an 
analytical definition of the concept of damage offered in South 
Africa, damage is the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing 
event, in the utility or quality of a patrimonial or personality 
interest in satisfying the legally recognised needs of the person 
involved1. 
German law draws a distinction between the term damage 
(German: Schaden) in its natural and legal sense. Damage, in its 
natural sense is defined as any diminution, as a result of a 
damage causing-event, that a person sustains in his legally 
protected rights. This definition corresponds with the South 
African definition of damage given above. In certain cases, 
damage in its natural sense is complemented and corrected by a 
legal perception of the term damage. As a result, damage in its 
legal sense is recognised, even though there is no diminution in 
one person's patrimony. As the legal sense of the term damage 
has developed through case law, it is generally recognised that 
the legal sense of damage cannot be defined but has to be 
considered in every single case2. As the definition above 
indicates, in both legal systems only harm in regard to legally 
1 Harms & Vessels, The Law of South Africa, Volume 7, at p. 9 
2 Palandt/Heinrichs, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, 59. Auflage 1999, Vor. § 249, No. 7 
3 
recognised patrimonial and non-patrimonial interests of a person 
q~alifies as damage3. 
In German law, the term "damage" is used to denote both 
patrimonial (pecuniary) damage and non-patrimonial (non-
pecuniary) loss4. In South Africa, the situation is not so clear. 
Some authors5 define damage only as patrimonial loss. This 
approach is based on the assumption that patrimonial damage 
and injury to personality do not share any meaningful common 
dominator. Other South-African authors6 are of the opinion that 
damage is a broad concept which consists of patrimonial as well 
as non-patrimonial loss7. They argue that any other interpretation 
in terms of a restricted view of damage would obviously have 
unjust results. In South African law, however, no clearly defined 
line exists between patrimonial and non patrimonial damage8. In 
German law the differences between patrimonial and non-
patrimonial loss are expressed in § 253 of the German civil code 
BGB providing that the injured cannot claim monetary 
compensation ( Geldersatz) but only restitution in kind 
(Natura/restitution) in cases of non-patrimonial loss. (except §§ 
847, 1300 8GB). 
b) patrimonial Joss 
Under South-African law, patrimonial loss is defined as the 
diminution in the utility of a patrimonial interest in satisfying the 
legally recognised needs of the person entitled in such interest. It 
can also be considered the loss or reduction in value of a positive 
3 Neethling, Potgieter, Visser, Law od Delict, second edition, at p. 198 
4 Palandt/Heinrichs, Vor. § 249, No. 7 
5 Van der Walt, 1980 THRHR3; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 34; Boberg, The Law of 
Delict, at. p 435 
6 Visser and Potgeter, Damages at p. 27-28; Neetling and Potgieter, Law of Delict 
at p. 200 
7 Harms, Vessels, The Law of South Africa, Volume 7, at p. 9 
8 Neetling, Potgieter, Visser, Law of Delict, at. p 202 
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asset in someone's patrimony or the creation or increase of a 
negative element of such patrimony (a patrimonial debt)9. Despite 
the fact that the German BGB contains no definition of patrimonial 
loss, a similar definition is accepted in Germany. 
2. Basic Concept 
a) Traditional Sum-Formula Approach 
In both legal systems, the sum-formula approach has been the 
basis for the nature and assessment of patrimonial law10. This 
approach describes a comparative method through which damage 
is determined by subtracting the plaintiff's present patrimonial 
position (after the damage-causing event has occurred) from the 
hypothetical patrimonial position which he would have enjoyed 
had the damage-causing event not occurred 11 . This general 
principle of compensation has found expression in § 249 
Sentence 1 BGB, which states that a person who is obliged to 
make compensation must restore the situation which would have 
existed if the circumstances which render him liable to make 
amends had not occurred. 
b) Criticism of the sum-formula approach 
In South Africa, the sum-formula has been subjected to criticism. 
First, it has been said that the sum-formula is not supported by 
the doctrine of interesse in Roman law? Secondly, it has been 
argued that the sum-formula assesses the damage to 
anonymously as it does not indicate how the amount is made up 13. 
Thirdly, the sum-formula has been considered to potentially 
9 Neetling, Potgieter, Visser, Law of Delict, at. p .206 
10 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 59 
11 Erasmus, Gauntlett, The Law of South Africa, First Reissue, Volume 7, at p 19 
. 
12 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 64 
··· 
13 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 64 
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confuse t has been considered the patrimonial and the causal 
elements of damage 14, because damage has been determined 
with the sum-formula, at the same time this shows that the 
damage-causing event is a necessary condition in terms of the 
condition sine qua non "test" of causation 15. 
c) Concrete Concept of Damage 
Those who argue in favour of the abolition of the sum-formula 
simultaneously advocate acceptfng a concrete concept of 
damage. A concrete approach focuses on the withdrawal or 
deterioration of a particular part of someone's patrimony and is 
concerned with individual heads of damage 16. 
Under German law, in cases of damnum emergens damage is 
generally assessed in a concrete way. (konkrete 
Schadensberechnung), because § 249 BGB provides that 
damage generally has to be compensated in kind. If monetary 
compensation is claimed instead, the focus shiftes to the real 
diminution of somone's p9trimony regarding one individual head 
of damage. 
In the case of lucrum cessans, an abstract assessment of 
damage (abstrakte Schadensberechnung) plays a decisive 
role 17. In these cases, damages are awarded according to an 
average standard18. One example of an abstract assessment of 
damage can be found in § 252 sentence 2 8GB. This Article 
provides for the presumed loss of profit which in the ordinary 
course of events could have been expected, or according to 
special circumstances, especially in the light of the preparations 
14 Reinicke, 1988 de Jure at p. 225 
15 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 65 
16 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 66 
17 PalandUHeinrichs, Vor. § 249, No. 50 
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and arrangements made. This presumption can, however, be 
rebutted and is systematically to be qualified only as a 
presumption of law. 
Another example of the abstract assessment of damage can be 
found in § 288 paragraph 1 8GB. This provides that interests of 
4% per year are payable unless the creditor has reason to claim a 
higher percentage. Accordingly, an abstract assessment of 
damage is allowed in favour of the creditor. 
Where the assessment of damages according to average 
standards is not permitted, damages are to be assessed as 
concrete, i.e. according to. the diminution the plaintiff has 
sustained in his patrimony. In this context the sum-formula 
approach still play a decisive role in Germany. 
In summary, one can say that the sum-formula approach is well 
established in both legal systems. Nevertheless, adding certain 
principles of the South African concrete concept of damage in 
order to modify the sum-formula in certain aspects could be 
useful. In cases of damnum emergens for example a concrete 
concept of damage can be used to measure the damage without 
using a hypothetical element 19 as in these cases, the quantum of 
damage often will be obvious. If, for example a dog has been run 
over by a car the loss suffered is the value of the dog which can 
be assessed without comparing the present patrimonial position 
with the hypothetical patrimonial position. On the other hand, the 
sum-formula and the comparative method are inevitably used to 
assess prospective loss, loss of profit or contractual damage20. 
18 Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Band I at. p 417 
19 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 67 
20 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 67 
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The following section discusses the calculation of damages for 
patrimonial loss resulting from damage to property, loss of use of 
object and fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Ill. Damage to property 
Under South African law, the principle of delictual compensation -
that the plaintiff be placed financially in as good position as he 
would have been in a had the delict not been committed -
requires that the plaintiff be awarded the diminution in the value 
of his property that the delict has brought about21. This measure 
of damage caused by injury to property is usually the diminution 
in its market value22. This diminution is measured by subtracting 
the post-accident market value of the property from its pre-
accident market value23. An easier way to calculate the loss is to 
rely upon the reasonable costs of necessary repairs as a measure 
of damage. Such evidence, however, is not always a reliable 
indication· of the diminution in value, as the case of Erasmus v 
Davis24 showed. 
1. Erasmus v Davis 
In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for R930 in respect 
. of the damage her motor car sustained in a collision caused by 
the defendant's negligence. Evidence for the plaintiff established 
that (a) the pre-collision value of the car was 1200, (b) the 
reasonable cost of repairing the damaged bodywork was R771; 
and (c) after the collision the car was sold to a scrap-car dealer 
as salvage for R270. There was no other evidence of the car's 
post-accident value. 
21 Boberg, Law of Delict, at p. 622 
22 Boberg, Law of Delict, at p. 622 
23 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 330 
24 1969 (2) SA 1 (A) at 18 
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The magistrate awarded the plaintiff the R930 claimed, on the 
basis that this was the difference between the car's pre-accident 
value (R1200) and its post-accident value (R270). 
On appeal to the Provincial Division, the court held that the 
magistrate's award could not stand because the plaintiff had not 
proved the car's post accident value to be R270. The Provincial 
Division was, however, of the opinion that the assessors 
unchallenged evidence as to the reasonable costs of repairs 
showed that the least amount the plaintiffs damage was R771. 
This sum was therefore awarded to the plaintiff. 
The defendant's appeal to the Appellate Division was dismissed 
by the majority of the court. In its judgement, the majority of the 
court explained that the plaintiff is entitled to establish the 
difference between the pre-accident and post-accident value of 
his property in order to prove the diminution in value to his 
property. The majority of the court held that from the fact that 
present plaintiff had failed to do so, it did not follow that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to succeed. The majority of the court was 
rather of the opinion that evidence of the reasonable costs of 
repairs constitutes prima facie proof of the diminution in value of 
property, and that it is for the defendant to cast doubt on the 
validity of these measure of loss25• 
Another view was put forward by Muller AJA in his dissenting 
judgement. Here Muller AJA pointed out three instances where 
the cost of repairs cannot serve as a measure of damage and 
damages: 
25 1969 (2) SA 1 (A) at 12 
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(a) where the cost of repairs exceeds the pre-accident value of 
the property; 
(b) where the cost of repairs exceeds the diminution in value; 
( c) where the repairs, though restoring the property to its pre-
accident condition, do not also restore its pre-accident market-
value. 
In Muller's view, since the real salvage value of the plaintiff's 
vehicle had not been established, possibility (b) had not been 
excluded. It had been for the plaintiff to prove the quantum of her 
loss, which entailed showing that the method she adopted for 
doing so was an appropriate one in the circumstances. Muller 
AJA concluded that because she had failed to do this, the plaintiff 
was not entitled to any damages. 
This decision has caused some differences of opinion among 
commentators. Boberg26 view is that the true criterion is the 
diminution in value and the plaintiff is required to prove this fact. 
In his view, the cost of repairs is only circumstantial evidence of 
this fact when, on a preponderance of probabilities, it creates an 
interference, that .such cost is the least amount of money required 
to make up the diminution in value. According to Boberg, it this is 
not, per se, the most probable interference. He concluded 
therefore that Muller AJA's approach was correct. 
Other authors27 are unconvinced of Boberg's argument. They 
purport that, in most cases, it would be impractical to assess the 
market value of a motor vehicle involved in an accident and that 
26 1969 Annual Survey, at p 153 
27 Visser & Potgieter, Law of Damages, at. p. 333 
the reasonable and necessary cost of repairs would be the best 
indication of diminution in value. 
To summarise the South African position, generally damages are 
assessed according to the diminution in value at the time of 
damage. The· reasonable cost of repairs may be taken into 
account in assessing damages where the pre-damage value is 
established, but where the plaintiff fails to prove the post-damage 
value. The cost of repairs alone may be an appropriate measure 
where it is shown that the repairs were necessary, fair and 
reasonable. 
2. German position 
Although § 249 sentence 1 BGB states that damage normally has 
to be restituted in kind, the necessary costs of repairs also play 
an important role in the assessment of damages. This is because 
§ 249 sentence 2 BGB contains an exception to the rule that 
damage has to be restituted in kind, providing that in cases of 
injury to a person or damage to property the plaintiff can claim the 
amount necessary to restitute the pre-accident condition of the 
property. This amount is normally represented by the necessary 
costs of repairs. As the ratio of § 249 BGB is to protect the 
integrity of the property, the equivalent amount of the costs of 
repairs can on principle also be claimed: 
(a) where the cost of repairs exceeds the pre-accident value of 
the property or 
(b) where the cost of repairs exceeds the diminution in value, 
if this necessary to restitute the pre-accident condition of the 
property. 
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An exception to this rule follows from the principle of good faith, 
which finds expression in § 252 II 8GB. The consequence of this 
article is that the diminution in the value of the property and not 
the costs of repairs must be used to measure the amount of 
compensation, if the costs of repairs are unreasonably high. In 
cases of damage to cars, German courts have held that the costs 
of repairs are unreasonably high if they exceed the pre-accident 
value of the car by more than 30% .. However, this rule is not rigid 
and has to be considered from case to case. 
If the property is destroyed or the if the costs of repairs are too 
high the plaintiff is allowed to claim the costs for the replacement 
of the property. This is usually will be higher than its market-value 
(the selling price). This follows from the rule laid do_wn in § 249 
Sentece 1 BGB that the pre-accident condition has to be 
restituted and, accordingly, the plaintiff is to be put in the position 
of having the funds to get an equivalent item28. 
While § 249 BGB protects the interest in the integrity of the 
property (lntigritatsinteresse), § 251 BGB additionally protects 
the interest in its value (Wertinteresse). According to this, the 
plaintiff can claim monetary compensation if the restitution of the 
pre-accident condition is impossible or inadequate. This includes 
cases where the repair takes an unreasonably long time or those 
where the repairs, though restoring the property to its pre-
accident condition, do not also restore its pre-accident market-
value29. As distinct from the compensation payable according to 
§ 249 8GB, the measure of compensation is in the realm of§ 251 
BGB not the costs of repairs but the diminution in the value of the 
property. 
28 Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Band I at. p 400 
29 Palandt/Heinrichs, § 251 No. 4 
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3. Comparison of the South-African and German position 
While German law gives priority to the interest in the integrity of 
property South African law merely protects the interest in the 
value of the property. This can lead to different results where the 
cost of repairs exceeds the pre-accident value of the property or 
where the cost of repairs exceeds the diminution in value. While 
South African courts in these cases assess the amount of 
compensation strictly according to the diminution in value, 
German courts see the relevant measure in the cost of repairs, as 
long as they are not unreasonably high. 
IV. loss of use 
The assessment of damages is especially complicated when 
damages for consequential loss are claimed . One typical 
consequential loss is the loss of the possibility to use property. 
This may be the result of different types of damage-causing 
events, such as damage to property, theft, alienation or 
destruction of property3°. Loss of use may cause damage in the 
form of a loss of profit or income, because an article could not be 
used, or damage in the form of the reasonable cost of acquiring a 
substitute31 . However, under South African law, it is not clear 
whether damages may be recovered for any loss of use of 
property, unless such loss is caused by unlawful and culpable 
impairment, withdrawal or retention of the object in question32 • 
30 Visser and Potgieter at p. 334 
31 Visser and Potgieter at p. 334 
32 Stoll, Visser, "Some thoughts on delictual damages for the loss of use of 
property in terms of South African and German Law", De Jure 1990 at p. 347 
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1. Case law 
South African courts first awarded damages for the loss of use 
where the res was used to run a business. This was the case, for 
example, in Mosselbay Divisional Council v Oosthuizern33. 
a) Masse/bay Divisional Council v Oosthuizern 
In this case, the plaintiff claimed damages for loss of income from 
the defendant who had negligently damaged the plaintiff's taxi. 
The court held that where damage to property deprives a man of 
the means of making a living, he can claim that loss of income he 
is able to prove as to be his average daily income. 
b) Shrog v Va/entine34 
This rule was further developed and extended in Shrog v 
Valentine. In this case, the plaintiff's lorry, which he used in his 
business, was damaged through the negligence of the defendant. 
The plaintiff had caused the lorry towed to a garage and while it 
was being repaired there he hired another vehicle to use for 
business. With regard to Mossel Bay Divisional Council v 
Oosthuizen35, the court pointed out that where a vehicle which is 
damaged through the negligence of another has been in- use in its 
owners business the damages recoverable, apart from the costs 
of repairs, include the loss of income to the owner due to the loss 
of use of the vehicle.· The loss could be proved by the plaintiff 
showing his loss of profit and the interference with his business 
as a result of his being deprived of the use of his lorry. The court 
then held that hiring the substitute lorry was an necessary act to 
mitigate the loss of income. As a person is entitled to recover the 
expenses to which he has been put, in minimising the damage the 
33 1933 CPD 509 at 511 
34 1949 (3) SA 1228. 
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court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to claim damages 
not only for the cost of the repairs but also for the loss of use. 
c) Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmacy36 
In Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmacy, however, the court 
expressed a reserved view on the subject in question. In this 
case, the property of the plaintiff (a firm of monumental masons) 
was stored in the basement of premises in which the defendant 
carried on a business on the ground floor. Due to the negligence 
of the defendant, s servants, a tap was left turned on with the 
result that water seeped through the basement causing damage 
to the plaintiff's property. Besides other damages, the plaintiff 
claimed damages for the loss of use of the basement for 30 days 
to the sum of the monthly rent of R 224,50 that the plaintiff paid 
for the hire of the premises. The defendant argued that the loss of 
use of the basement was only for the nine days that it took to 
clear the - basement of water and goods, while the plaintiff 
submitted that an additional compensation for the three months, 
inconvenience due to the flooding of the basement should be 
awarded. 
The court held that in a delictual action damages is awarded for 
patrimonial loss alone and not for inconvenience, discomfort, 
annoyance or vexation unassociated with any pecuniary loss. 
Accordingly, the court awarded damages only for the period of 
nine days that it took to clear the basement. 
35 1933 CPD 509 at 511 
36 1976 (2) SA 111 (C) 
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d) Smit v Abrahams37 
The case of Smit v Abrahams shows nowadays it is out of 
question to award damages for loss of use where the res was 
used in a business. In this case, a vehicle belonging to the 
plaintiff had been irreparably damaged in a collision with a 
vehicle driven by the appellant. The plaintiff had used the vehicle 
in his hawker business. The plaintiff claimed first of all, payment 
of the market value of the vehicle and, secondly, compensation 
for the three month rental which the plaintiff had paid for the use 
of another vehicle which he had had to hire to conduct his 
business. It appeared from evidence that the respondent had not 
been in a financial position to afford purchasing another vehicle, 
or even to pay the deposit on one. 
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs damages regarding the 
loss of use were not recoverable, because they were brought 
about by the plaintiff's impecuniosity. 
·-
The magistrate's court found that the plaintiff had acted 
reasonably in continuing as a hawker and in hiring a substitute 
vehicle for the period covered by the claim. An appeal to a 
Provincial Division against the award of damages on the second 
claim failed. Finally, the defendant's appeal was dismissed by the 
Appellate Division. 
e) Criticism of the case law 
These decisions were the subject of criticism. Lee and Honore38, 
for example, suggest that a claim for- loss of use of something 
should not be confined to an article used for business purposes. 
They argue that a plaintiff who proves patrimonial loss is entitled 
37 1992 (3) SA 158 (C) 
38 Obligations 251-2 
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to the reasonable cost of providing himself with a substitute. As 
example they refer to a retired pensioner whose vehicle has been 
damaged. In their opinion, this pensioner should not have to rely 
on charity but should be entitled to recover an amount equal to 
his usual transport costs for the period. According to Lee and 
Honore, these damages should be assessed as the difference 
between the costs of the substitute transport and the usual 
running costs of the vehicle39 . 
. This view is supported by Visser and Potgieter40 . In their view it is 
indefensible to limit compensation to instances where property is 
employed to generate income, since a loss of use is not 
dependent upon the fact that property is used in earning income. 
Van der Walt41 suggests that a distinction has to be drawn 
between temporary and permanent loss of use. In his opinion, 
permanent loss of use always constitutes compensable damage, 
irrespective of whether the plaintiff would or could in fact have 
used the property in question. Where there is temporary loss of 
the use of property, Van der Walt submits that a distinction has to 
be made between the position of an owner and a non- owner. He 
argues that a non-owner suffers damage irrespective of whether 
or not he would have used the article during the relevant period. 
The situation of an owner is different as his power to use the 
property is not of limited duration. Van der Walt therefore 
concluded that temporary loss of use can only amount to damage 
if the plaintiff proves that either a) he would have used the .article 
during the relevant period, or b) that he has already incurred 
expenses to protect himself against the consequences of a 
temporary loss of use, or c) that he has suffered loss of profit. 
39 Obligations 251-2 
40 Law of Damages at. p 335 
41 Van der Walt, Sommeskadeleer, at p. 287 
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f) Extension of the liability for loss of use: Kellerman v South 
African Transport Services42 
An important extension regarding the liability in cases of loss of 
use occurred in Kellerman v South African Transport Services. In 
this case, the appellant's motor vehicle had been damaged as a 
result of the negligence of one of the respondent's employee's. 
While the vehicle was being repaired, the appellant hired a motor 
car at a cost of R1674 which he personally paid and which he 
thereafter sought to recover from the respondent. 
As the motor vehicle was not used in the generation of the 
plaintiff's income, this case was different from the cases in Shrog 
v Valentine and Mosselbay v Oosthuizern. 
Marais J, · in distinguishing the present case from the case in 
Monumental Art, explained the difference between saying that 
there is no compensation for inconvenience, discomfort, 
annoyance or vexation and that compensation can never be 
recovered for the loss of use of a res which is not used in the 
generation or production of income, even though such loss of use 
has caused patrimonial loss. Marais J is of the opinion, that there 
is no good reason to deny compensation where the deprivation of 
use of such a res occurs in circumstances and at a time which 
make it entirely reasonable for the owner of the res to use a 
temporary substitute and where he suffers patrimonial loss as a 
consequence. 
Furthermore, Marais J purported that ownership of a res 
· embraces the right to use it for the functional purpose for which it 
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was designed. In his view, this availability for use has an 
economic value which is reflected in the prevailing rate of hire of 
such a res. Accordingly, Marais J sees himself to be entirely in 
accord with the principles of Aquilian liability that the third party 
whose negligence caused the loss of use of the owner's own res 
should have to compensate the owner for expenses so incurred. 
In his view, this is especially cogent in cases where deprivation of 
use, occurrs at a time when the owner reasonably desired to use 
the res. As a consequence the owner then incurs expense to 
which he otherwise would not have been put in obtaining the 
temporary use of a substitute. 
On the other hand, Marais J emphasised that each claim of this 
part has to be decided on its own merits, and each claimant will 
have to satisfy the court that his decision to hire a substitute was 
a reasonable one. If no use was intended to be made of the res 
during the period it was under repair, no claim for loss can arise. 
The claimant than will not of course be entitled to an additional 
sum to compensate him for the inconvenience to which he has 
been put by having to hire a substitute. 
In the present case, the court concluded that it was reasonable to 
hire a substitute car and accordingly awarded damages to the 
plaintiff. 
2. Evaluation of the case law 
From the above discussion, it is clear that that South African 
courts only award damages for the loss of use of property where 
the plaintiff has suffered actual patrimonial loss as a result of the 
42 1993 (4) SA 872 (C) 
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loss of use43• In this respect, the rule is still valid that no damages 
may be awarded for "inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance or 
vexation unassociated with any pecuniary loss44 . Pecuniary loss 
can either occur in the form of loss of income, in the form of 
expenses reasonably occurred in mitigating damages, or in the 
expenses occurred in obtaining the temporary use of a substitute. 
3. German position
German courts have extended the borders of liability drawn by
South African courts. This is surprising as the German position,
laid down in the German civil Code 8GB, does not greatly differ
from the South-African one described above. In terms of § 253
8GB, compensation in money is generally only available for
patrimonial damage. According to this article, damages can
consequently only be claimed if the loss of use has led to a
quantifiable patrimonial loss; for example, loss of profit due to the
loss of use of a car.
German courts, however, have never applied this article strictly. 
Rather, they have awarded the costs incurred in renting a 
substitute car if the plaintiff has actually hired one for the 
necessary period of repairs. This is fi in the courts opinion these 
costs are costs which must be expended in order to bring about. 
restitution and are therefore claimable in terms of § 249 (second 
sentence) 8GB. In this respect, German Courts made no 
difference whether the car was use exclusively for enjoyment or 
for the exercise of any profitable activity. 
43 
Harms and Wessels, The Law of.South Africa, Vol.7 at. p 52 
44 
see Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmaty (Pty) Ltd 1976 2 SA 111 (C) 124 
' 
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In further development of German law, it was found unsatisfactory 
to let the defendant benefit from the fact that the plaintiff did not 
hire a substitute car. Primarily because of this unfairness, 
German courts have held that the loss of a privately used car may 
give rise to an award for pecuniary damages suffered, even if the 
plaintiff does not rent a substitute car does not or incur additional 
expenses nor loses any profit45. 
An important factor underlying this solution was the theory of 
commercialisation of loss of use. According to this, the personal 
advantages associated with the use of an object form an 
independent economic asset if they can only be "purchased" by 
expenditure of money. In this sense, personal advantages and 
convenience are of a commercial nature. The German High Court 
(BGH), however, based its decision mainly on the general view 
that the availability of a car both at work and at home saves time 
and energy and that the resulting advantages are accordingly to 
be regarded as "money". 
In consequence of these decisions, damages for the loss of use 
of a caravan, a motor boat or a valuable fur coat were claimed. 
The courts did not award these damages, explaining that only the 
loss of something indispensable for one's daily needs may be 
viewed as a pecuniary loss; while the loss of use of a luxury item 
only affects the non-pecuniary sphere. 
These distinction have been much criticised on the grounds that 
even the loss of a luxury item may obviously be expressed in 
money. Furthermore, it has been argued that according to the 
sum-formula approach (Differenhypothese), there is no 
45 see BGHZ 40, 345 and BGHZ 45,212 
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patrimonial loss where the plaintiff has not paid any additional 
costs, for example for hiring a substitute. 
In countering this argument some authors have developed the so 
called theory of frustration (Frustrationslehre). This approach is 
based on the idea that the owner of a vehicle pays maintenance 
costs, such as tax, insurance and servicing costs in order to "buy" 
the use of the vehicle. If using the vehicle is impossible due to a 
damage-causing event, these costs are vain. Some authors46 see 
in this fact a form of patrimonial loss which has to be 
compensated according to§ 251 paragraph 1 8GB. 
This approach lacks cogency, as the maintenance costs are not 
the result of the damage-causing event: The owner would have 
paid the maintenance costs even in the absence the damage-
causing event. The theory of frustration would, furthermore, lead 
to a claim in cases where the owner cannot use the res because 
of a bodily injury, as the maintenance costs would be vain in. this 
case, too. The injured party could not only claim the loss of use of 
his vehicle but also the loss of use of his flat or any other res he 
maintains. This result is not acceptable as it leads to 
indeterminate liability and opposes legal security. 
Today, it is accepted that neither the theory of commercialisation 
nor any other theory is able to establish damage in cases where 
the plaintiff has not hired a substitute car. However, as courts 
have allowed the plaintiff to recover his loss of use for over 30 
years, it is now customary law that recovery in these cases is 
possible, if the prevention of use was perceptible by the plaintiff. 
46 Eike Schmidt, JuS 1980, at p 636 
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Damages are generally denied to a plaintiff who neither could or 
would use the item damaged or withheld for the period in 
question. Accordingly, abstract damages for the loss of use were 
denied to the plaintiff owner of a car where he was himself injured 
in the accident that caused the damage and could not in any 
event have used the car during the period of repairs47 . 
4. Conclusion 
.. 
This view of the German position shows that an extension of the 
scope of liability for loss of use is difficult to establish, in cases 
where the injured has had no additional expenses. This result 
mainly from the fact that loss of use per se does not constitute 
damage in terms of the sum-formula approach 
(Differenzhypothese). The attempt to create a new form of 
patrimonial damage was not successful, as no theory could 
convincingly explain why only the loss of use of certain items 
could be regarded as patrimonial loss. 
From the theoretical point of view, it is therefore most convincing 
to award damages only in cases where the plaintiff has suffered 
patrimonial loss in its classic sense. This may lie either in a loss 
of profit or the reasonable costs incurred for hiring a substitute. It 
might initially appear unjust to let the defendant benefit from the 
fact that the plaintiff does not hire a substitute. Furthermore, to 
keep insurance costs low, it has been considered an useful bonus 
to award damages lower than the hiring costs, in order to 
discourage the plaintiff away from hiring a substitute. 
This is, of course, not the right solution. In my view, the fact that a 
plaintiff has not hired a substitute is evidence that the hire of a 
substitute was neither necessary nor reasonable. Where a 
47 BGH NJW 1968 at. p 1778 
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plaintiff has hired a substitute, he should have to prove, that this 
decision to hire was a reasonable one. This proof can only be 
easily provided where the hire of a substitute is necessary to 
avoid an equally large or even larger pecuniary loss. In other 
cases, it will be difficult to establish that the owner reasonably 
desired to use the res, which was the criterion used in Kellerman. 
In my view it is not inequitable to use a restrictive approach in 
cases of loss of use, as the possibility of using a res is, iri 
general,. not a right which deserves special legal protection. Not 
beeing able to use a res might be inconvenient, uncomfortable, 
annoying or vexatious, but this is not reason enough for success 
in an action, as the court has stated correctly in Monumental Art 
Co v Kenston Pharmacy48• I therefore conclude that the restrictive 
approach purported by the South-African courts serves justice 
better than the ill-founded approach German courts have 
adopted. 
V. Fraudulent misrepresentation 
Another controversial issue is the assessment of damage caused 
by fraudulent misrepresentation. Under South-African law 
fraudulent misrepresentation is defined as a false statement of 
fact (or possibly opinion), which is made in the course of 
negotiating a contract, with the requisite fraudulent knowledge 
and intent, which induces a party to contract (either at all or on 
the terms in fact agreed on) but which does not become a term of 
the contract49. As the false statement does not become a term of 
the contract, the fact that the representation is false does not give 
rise to breach of contract. Consequently, the aggrieved party has 
48 1976 (2) SA 111 (C) 
49 Cameron, 1982 SALJ 109 
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no contractual claim for damages. Accordingly, he is not entitled 
to claim to have been placed in the position he would have 
occupied had the misrepresentation been true, because that is 
the contractual measure50. The misrepresentee's claim for 
damages arises in delict and is therefore governed by delictual 
principles. 
As the contract is not void, the misrepresentee has the choice 
between resiling and claiming damages, and enforcing the 
contract and claiming damages51 . Consequently, the question 
which delictual principles apply is initially dependent on the fact 
whether the misrepesentee cancels or uphelds the contract. 
Where the misrepresentee cancels the contract, the situation is 
relatively clear, the misrepresentee must, as far as possible, 
restore what he has received, reclaim what he has performed and 
claim whatever damages he may have sustained, generally in the 
form of wasted costs52. The measure of these damages is that 
sum which will restore the misrepresentee to his position prior to 
the misrepresentation, or the sum of all losses sustained as a 
direct consequence of having been induced to enter into the 
contract53. This follows from the basic principle of placing the 
plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the delict had not 
occurred. 
The problem is more complicated where the misrepresentee 
seeks both to maintain the contract and sue for damages. This 
problem results mainly out of the fact that the misrepresentee has 
in most cases already received something from the other party 
pursuant to the contract, and he may have difficulty proving that, 
50 Dlamini, 1985 De Jure p. 347 
51 Frost v Leslie 1923 AD 276 
52 Dlamini, p.351 
53 Erasmus & Gauntlett, The Law of South Africa, Vol. 7 at. p 53 
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despite what he has received, he is still worse off than if there 
had been no contract54. 
In order to cope with these difficulties,different approaches have 
been followed by the appellate division in the assessment of 
damages in cases where fraudulent misrepresentation has 
induced a contract. Originally,the appellate division followed the 
so-calles approach of the comparison of the two performances. 
This approach provides that if the misrepresentee received less 
that what he paid for, he suffered loss. But if he received more or 
equal to what he paid for, he would not have suffered any loss 
and therefore would not be entitled to damages. The difference 
between the purchase price and the real value of the merx is 
therefore the measure of damages55. This rule was applied in 
Trotman v Edwick. 
1. Trotman v Edwick56 
In this case, the seller of an erf with two flats on it led the 
purchaser to believe that a strip of municipal land adjoining the 
erf formed part of the merx. Although the case involved causal 
misrepresentation, the purchaser elected to abide by the contract 
and sue for damages in delict. 
The Appellate Division held that the correct measure of damages 
for the seller's fraud was the difference between the purchase 
price and the market value of the land actually sold. 
In later cases, however, the appellate division did not follow the 
measure of damages proposed in the Trotman case. The question 
was no longer whether or not the misrepresentee received less 
54 Dlamini, p. 351 
55 De Jager v Grunder 1964 1 SA 446 (A) 
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than what he paid, but how much more he was induced to pay by 
reason of the delict. In this respect, his out-of-pocket loss is the 
difference between the purchase price and the putative price, 
namely the price they would have agreed upon in the absence of 
fraud. This approach was first applied in Bill Harvey's Investment 
Trust v Orangezicht Citrus Estates. 
2. Bill Harvey· s Investment Trust v Orangezicht Citrus Estates 57 
In this case, the plaintiff bought a citrus farm from the defendant 
and the defendant fraudulently misrepresented the number of 
citrus trees. The plaintiff relied on the decision in the Trotman 
case and claimed in delict for the difference between the contract 
price and the true value of the merx. The Appellate Division held 
that this was not the appropriate measure of damages. 
In order to distinguish this case from the Trotman case, the court 
explained· that, in the latter, the misrepresentation affected the 
value of the property as an indivisible whole. In the Bill Harvey 
case, in contrast, the representation merely affected a specific 
aspect, namely, the number of the citrus trees. The court 
furthermore pointed out that in the Trotman Case the causal 
connection between the misrepresentation and the damages 
awarded was clearly established, whereas it was not in the Bill 
Harvey case. Consequently, the plaintiff could recover only such 
part of his loss as had been caused by the representation and not 
for loss resulting from his own bad bargaining. Accordingly, the 
court awarded only R3000 as the value of the missing trees which 
represented the amount he had been induced to pay by his 
relying on the misrepresentation. 
56 1951 (1) SA 443 (A) 
57 1958 (1) SA 579 (A) 
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This decision was criticised on the grounds that the court did not 
properly apply the principles for the assessment of damages in 
the case of do/us incedens. It has been submitted that the court, 
did not enquire what the misrepresentee would have offered in 
absence of fraud and whether the seller would have accepted 
that. Instead the court simply placed value on the missing trees 
and regarded this as damage58. Some authors59 argue that this 
amounts to positive interesse as a result of breach of contract, 
and they therefore criticise the court because the facts of the 
case did not justify such a finding. 
3. Scheepers v Handley6° 
In the case of Scheepers v Handley and despite the criticism 
expressed, the court followed the pattern in the Bill Harvey case; 
namely, how much more the misrepresentee had been induced to 
pay by relying the representation. In the Scheepers v Handley 
case the· defendant fraudulently misrepresented the extent of a 
farm sold by public auction. The plaintiff claimed damages 
representing the difference between the purchase price and the 
value of the property at the time of the sale based upon a shortfall 
of 231 morgen. 
The court awarded the plaintiff the amount he had been induced 
to pay more by reason of his having relied upon the truth of the 
misrepresentation_. 
58 De Vos 1964 Acta Juridca 36; Mulligan 1958 SALJ 132-133; Kahn "Random 
Reflections on Damages for Misrepresenation" 1961 SLAJ 145 
59 De Vos 1964 Acta Juridca 36; Mulligan 1958 SALJ 132-133; Kahn "Random 
Reflections on Damages for Misrepresenation" 1961 SLAJ 145 
60 1960 (3) SA 54 (A) . 
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4. De Jager v Grunder61 
A new trend emerged in De Jager v Grunder. In this case, · G and 
D had entered into an agreement of exchange of their respective 
farms. D had fraudulently misrepresented the number and value 
of pine trees on one of his farms (Magermanskraal) . G alleged 
that, had he known the truth, he would have insisted upon 
Magermanskraal being valued lower and he sued for the 
difference. D argued that G had suffered no loss as the assets G 
had received from D were worth more than what he had 
transferred to D. 
The majority of the court held that damage caused by fraud does 
not merely relate to a comparison of the value of the performance 
and the counter performance. Such a comparison is correct only 
in cases where there would have been no contract in the absence 
of the misrepresentation (do/us dans). In this case, it would be 
unjust to limit damage to damages emanating from the 
comparison of what each party had performed, as in the absence 
of the misrepresentation, the plaintiff would have contracted, but 
on different terms (do/us incedens). The court pointed out that it 
was not the fraud which caused the favourable price to be 
negotiated for G, s land and that it would be unfair to deprive him 
of such benefit. Accordingly, the majority of the court upheld G's 
suit, finding that in determining G's damages regard was to be 
had only to Magermanskraal. 
The minority judgement differed from the majority view that the 
plaintiff had proved his damages. Rumpff JA explained, that in the 
absence of proof of a putative price, the fair market value must be 
treated as the putative price on the assumption that both parties 
would at least have agreed on the market value of the merx as the 
61 1964 (1) SA 446 (A) 
. ., ' ""\:., 
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price. If the purchase price is more than or equal to the market 
value, the plaintiff has suffered no loss. But if the market value of 
the merx is less than the purchase price, the difference will be the 
measure of damages. Rumpff JA found that there was no 
difference between what the plaintiff gave and what he received. 
In his view, even if this were incidental fraud, the plaintiff had not 
proved any loss. In the absence of proof of what the contract 
price would have been were it not for fraud, it must be assumed to 
be the market price, and once again the plaintiff had suffered no 
loss. 
Both judgements have given rise to criticism. The majority 
judgement was considered to- be wrong as it applied the 
contractual measure, in so far as the plaintiff was placed in a 
better position than the one he would have occupied had there 
been no misrepresentation62 . Another author is of the opinion that 
the plaintiff had not proved sustained damage, as the 
misrepresentee had not proved ante omnia that the market value 
of the merx which he received in his estate was less than the 
market value63 . 
In contrast to this, another author64 considers that the opinion that 
the minority judgement is neither just nor satisfactory. In his 
opinion, it is most unfair, in the context of causal 
misrepresentation, to limit proof of loss to comparison of pre- and 
post-contractual positions. The author continues that its is equally 
unfair, in the case of incidental misrepresentation, to saddle the 
innocent party with the initial burden of proving that, in the 
absence of the misrepresentation, the other terms of the contract 
62 Van der Merwe, 1964 THRHR 194 
63 De Wet 1960 ASSAL 94 
64 Cameron, at p107 
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would nevertheless have remained the same. This is virtually 
impossible to discharge in practice. 
Other authors65 are of the opinion that the minority judgement of 
Rumppf JA is correct according to the facts, but criticise the lack 
of significant difference between the arguments of the majority 
and the minority. In their view, the only difference existed as to 
the application of the legal principles to the facts of the case. The 
criterion used by all the judges in the case to determine the extent 
of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled, was the delictual 
one. This involved ascertaining what amount would suffice to 
place the injured party in the patrimonial position he would have 
occupied had the delict not been committed and not had the 
misrepresentation been true. According to these authors, even 
the majority applied this test, but was concerned about the too 
rigid application of a formula which might frustrate the main 
principle. 
The decision in De Jager gave further reason to the discussion 
whether the delictual or contractual measure was used in the 
majority judgement. Some authors66 are of the opinion that the 
effect of the judgement was to put the misrepresentee in the 
position he would have been in had there been no fraud. Other67 
consider that the effect of the judgement was to put the 
misrepresentee in the position in which he would have been had 
the misrepresentation been true . 
. 
65 Reinicke and Van der Merwe 1964 THRHR 294 
66 Van der Merwe and Reinecke, THRHR 66, Reinicke and Van der Merwe 1964 
THRHR 297 
67 Van der Merwe and Oliver, 324 
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5. Ranger v Wykerd68 
Whether to apply the contractual or the delictual measure was 
also the main question in the case Ranger v Wykerd. In this case, 
the plaintiff had bought a house, including a swimming pool, at 
the price of R22 000. The seller's husband fraudulently 
misrepresented the pool to be in good order and condition and 
the seller herself failed to disclose that it had serious structural 
defects. The plaintiff had the swimming pool repaired at a cost of 
R1250 which he claimed from the seller and her husband. He 
based his claim on the fact that, had he known of the defect, he 
would not have paid more than R20750 for the property. In the 
alternative, the plaintiff argued that R 1250 also represented the 
difference between the market value and the purchase price. The 
Appellate Division accepted the reasonable cost of repairs to be 
R1000 and awarded this amount to the plaintiff. 
Jansen JA, finding in favour of the appellant, expressed the 
opinion that the court should, in appropriate circumstances, be 
prepared to apply the contractual measure in order to do justice 
between the parties. Referring to the De Jager case, Jansen JA 
said that in effect the majority applied the contractual "benefit of 
the bargain" measure whilst paying lip-service to the delictual 
principle of "out of pocket loss". According to Jansen JA, although 
the court applied the delictual measure in the Trotman case, "and 
has since purported to continue to do so", it has, in effect, in 
some instances determined damages on the basis of making good 
the representation and thus, in reality applied a contractual 
measure"69. Janse~ JA emphasised the policy advantage of the 
contractual measure which often allows recovery of a larger sum 
than the delictual test and pointed out that it is anomalous that a 
68 1977 (2) SA 976 (A) 
69 1977 (2) SA 976 (A) at 989 
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person "guilty of wilful fraud" should suffer less than one who 
merely breaches his contract7°. 
Trollip JA, delivering the majority judgement, did not agree. 
According to him, the basic measure is delictual, but its 
application to the particular facts of a case founded on fraud is 
problematic. He explained that one cause of the difficulty is the 
quantification of the patrimonial loss, another the application of 
the "swings and round-abouts principle". The applicability of this 
"swings and roundabouts principle" decides whether or not the 
claimant's loss on the swings (the cost of repairing the swimming 
pool) can be compensated by the gain on the roundabouts (the 
gain from the whole contract). 
In order to cope with these difficulties, the court approached the 
problem on the basis that if the defendants had intentionally or 
negligently physically damaged the swimming pool after the 
plaintiff had taken transfer of the property, they would have been 
liable for the reasonable cost of repairs as an indication of the 
diminution in value of the property. The court than pointed out 
that it should make no difference whether the delict in casu is 
fraud and not wilful injury to property. It explained that the main 
argument for differentiating between the two kinds of delicts rests 
on the applicability of the "swings and roundabouts principle". As 
the fraud, unlike the delict causing physical damage, is committed 
in a contractual context, it must be evaluated "not in isolation, but 
in context of the whole of that transaction"71 . As a result, whatever 
loss in incurred "on the swings" (through the cost of repairs) is 
compensable by the net gain in patrimony derived "on the 
roundabouts" through acquiring the property. If the plaintiff wants 
to establish his loss, he must prove that he has· not made any 
70 1977 (2) SA 976 (A) at 990 
71 1977 (2) SA 976 (A) at 991 
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compensatory net gain by proving that the property is now worth 
less than the price he had paid for it. If the plaintiff does not prove 
this, his claim fails despite evidence of expenditure incurred him 
as a result of the fraud. 
Turning to the facts before the court, Trollip JA began by 
assuming for the purposes of argument that the fraud was causal 
and that the "swings and roundabouts principle" should 
accordingly apply. Although the plaintiff did not lead any objective 
evidence as to the market value of the property, Trollip JA was 
nevertheless satisfied that the plaintiff had indeed proved his 
loss. Trollip came to this conclusion because of three crucial 
assumptions of fact. According to the first assumption, the 
purchase price of R22000 was prima facie its market value in its 
represented condition at the time of contracting. The actual 
market value of the property in its defective form must, therefore, 
have been less than R22000. The amount of R1000, which was 
the cost of repairing the defect must have been the value of the 
discrepancy. From these assumptions of Trollip JA the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had not made any net gain to be set 
off against his loss. As a result, he had proven his loss of R 1000, 
which could not regarded as too remote in the light of the 
negotiations. 
Cameron expresses reservations about the approaches of both 
judges in the Ranger case. She criticises Jansen JA's use of the 
contractual measure as departing from precedent and for creating 
uncertainty in the law72. She also objects to the use of factual 
assumptions on the grounds that it can not always be 
supportable, because it amounts to an evasion so some crucial 
issue. In her view it can be questioned, for instance, whether the 
72 Cameron, 1982 SALJ 113-114 
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"swings and roundabouts principle" should be applicable at all 
and therefore whether a plaintiff who has bargained well and has 
made an overall gain should be precluded from claiming damages 
for financial loss suffered as a result of the defendant's fraud73. 
I 
Cameron furthermore points out that it may not always be feasible 
to make such assumptions; for example where market value is 
clearly far different form the value agreed in the contract74. 
6. Colt Motors v Kenny75 
The next decision in this debate Colt Motors v Kenny made some 
useful contributions. In this case, the plaintiff had sold a 
Volkswagen Microbus to the defendant. In return the defendant 
had traded in an Audi motor car which he had described as a 
1980 model, whereas in fact it was a 1979 model. The plaintiff 
argued that he had agreed to a trade-in value that was R1550 
more than he would have agreed to had he not been misled. He 
thus claimed this amount as damages. 
The magistrate dismissed the claim for various reasons. On 
appeal, the court found that the plaintiff had not relied on the 
market value of the vehicle which the defendant traded in, but on 
the difference between the trade-in price of a 1980 model Audi 
and the trade-in price of a 1979 Audi. 
Stegmann J explained that the approach to follow was that of the 
majority in De Jager v Grunder76. In the present case, the effect of 
the misrepresentation had clearly been confined to the 
stipulations as to the trade-in value of the Audi and in 
consequence, the amount due by the defendant in respect of the 
73 Comeron, 1982 SALJ 114-115 
74 Comeron, 1982 SALJ 114-115 
75 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) 
76 SA 446 (A) 
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Microbus. In the court's opinion there was no indication that any 
other aspect of the transaction had been influenced by the 
misrepresentation. Thus, there was no need to bring any profit 
that the plaintiff would make on the sale of the Microbus into 
account on the "swings and roundabouts" principle enunciated in 
the Ranger case77. 
The court explained that it is typical of the delict of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, in contrast to other forms of delict, that the 
plaintiff seeks to prove his loss without reference to the market 
value of the relevant asset. This is caused by the fact that the 
plaintiff has often not meant to pay the market value and had 
been induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation to pay more than 
he would otherwise have done. Accordingly, the central question 
in fraudulent misrepresentation cases is how much more the 
plaintiff was induced to pay by the misrepresentation than he 
would have paid had it not been made78. Following the principle in 
Bill Harv~y's Investment Trust v Oranjezicht Citrus Estates79 , 
Stegmann J pointed out that the plaintiff was required to allege 
three facta probanda in order to make use of this principle. These 
are, first, the counterperformance which the plaintiff but for the 
'fraudulent misrepresentation, would have given for the 
defendants performance; secondly, the fact that by virtue of the 
fraudulent misrepresentation the plaintiff was induced to offer a 
higher counterperformance as the casual connection between the 
delict and the alleged damages; and thirdly the amount of such 
increased counterperformance. 
The court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had proved these 
three facta probanda and, accordingly, held that the plaintiff's 
77 1977 (2) SA 976 (A) at 991 H 
78 at 391 (G) 
79 1958 (1) SA 579 (A) at 483 F-G 
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claim should have been upheld. This decision is remarkable in 
the respect that the Bill Harvey principle was considered to be the 
underlying principle of the measure of damages in all cases 
where damages had been caused by fraudulent 
misrepresentation. The court was, furthermore, of the opinion that 
the majority of cases of fraud inducing a contract could be placed 
in one of the following categories: 
(1) In a case of do/us dans, where one may directly compare the 
values of performance and counterperformance, the correct 
measure of damages is the comparison of the market value of the 
plaintiff's patrimony before and after the commission of the 
unlawful conduct. 
(2) Where it is impractical to compare two patrimonial positions, 
damage may be seen as the reasonable cost of repairs. This 
approach is an extension of category ( 1 ) and was used in Ranger 
v Wykerd. 
(3) In a case involving do/us incedens, an increase in price 
caused by misrepresentation is seen as damage. In this case, the 
· plaintiff has to prove his damage without reference to market 
value by demonstrating how much more he was induced to pay for 
. the counterperformance. This method was for example used in De 
Jager v Grunder. 
As a practical approach to the assessment of damages, the court 
formulated the following guidelines: 
(1) A plaintiff who has suffered damage through fraudulent 
misrepresentation is not obliged by any rule of law to allege or 
I .. i 
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prove the market value of the merx which, as a result of fraud, he 
has purchased at an inflated price80. 
(2) To prove his damages it is open to the plaintiff to allege and 
prove what amount he would have been prepared to pay for the 
merx had he not been misled; and, without leading evidence, that 
the defendant would have accepted such amount. Unless the 
plaintiff's evidence is untrustworthy or other evidence is evidence 
is led to causes it to be doubted, his damages will the be 
determined on the difference between what he would have been 
prepared to pay and the increased amount which he agreed to 
pay as a result of the fraud81 . 
(3) If the plaintiff is not in a position to prove what amount he 
would have paid, he is then free to allege and prove the market 
value of the merx. In the absence of evidence justifying any other 
finding, it will then be inferred that the parties would have 
concluded the contract at the market price merx had the plaintiff 
not been misled. The plaintiff's damages are then determined as 
the difference between the market value and the increased 
amount, which because of the misrepresentation has been agreed 
upon82 . 
(4) If the plaintiff does not prove the market value of the merx the 
defendant himself is free to allege and prove the market value 
and thereby to oppose the plaintiff's case83. 
(5) If the price which the plaintiff alleges that he would have paid 
for the merx is lower than the market value of the merx, the 
plaintiff will further have to allege and prove that the defendant 
80 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) at p 380 
81 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) at p 380 
82 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) at p 380 
83 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) at p 380 
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would probably have accepted such lower price. In such a case, 
the Court would rather accept that the parties would have agreed 
on the market price unless the plaintiff discharges such onus84• 
7. Hunt v Van der Westhuizen85 
In Hunt v Van der Westhuizen, the plaintiff purchased a house 
and a swimming pool from the defendant for R140000. The 
defendant had fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that pool 
was of a particular quality. The plaintiff claimed R11500 as being 
the market price required to have the swimming pool conform to 
such a standard. The plaintiff argued that if she had known the 
pool was not of the represented quality, she would not have 
bought the house and would certainly not have gone to her 
maximum price of R140000. She also stated that there was no 
point in asking how much less she would have paid, since 
knowing that there was a brick pool would have decided her not 
to buy the house. 
The defendant gave evidence to the effect that the material of 
which the swimming pool was constructed made no difference to 
the market value. She considered that the true market value of 
the property was R 40000, which was the price which the 
purchaser was prepared to pay and the seller to accept. 
In its decision, the court first pointed out with regard to Ranger V 
Wykerd that though a claim based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation inducing a contract is founded on delict, it is 
now well established that, in appropriate circumstances, the 
measure of damages may be the reasonable cost of making good 
84 1987 (4) SA 378 (T) at p 380 
85 1990 3 SA 357 (C) 
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the misrepresentation. This is despite the fact that it coincides 
with the measure for breach of contract86. The court then raised 
the question whether it is still appropriate to distinguish cases of 
causal fraud (do/us dans) from cases of incidental fraud (do/us 
incedens). In the court's view, apart from the difficulty which may 
be occasioned by having to classify the fraud in question as 
causal or incidental, it is anomalous that a plaintiff alleging 
incidental fraud should be in a more favourable position than one 
who relies on causal fraud. With reference to Jansen JA in 
Ranger v Wykerd the court pointed out that the swings and 
roundabout principle results in a person who is guilty of wilful 
fraud suffering less that one who has merely breached his 
contract. The court was of the opinion that the deterrencing fraud 
in commercial relations is more likely to be achieved by a policy 
of compelling fraudulent wrongdoers to compensate their victims 
on a broad basis. The court supported the view that any gain and 
benefit which injured the plaintiff as a result of the contract 
should, in all cases, be treated as res inter alias acta vis a' vis the 
wrongdoer and should not figure in the assessment of damages. 
Applying this approach to the present case, the court explained 
that it would be irrelevant to consider the real market value of the 
property and to compare that with what was actually paid. The 
court concluded that to the extent that the value of the property 
was diminished by the swimming pool b~ing of less than of the 
represented quality, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover this 
amount as a material loss sustained by her and caused by the 
defendant's wrongdoing. 
In favour of the defendant, the court alternatively assumed that 
the case involved causal fraud which affected the transaction as a· 
86 1990 3 SA 357 (C) at 361 
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whole. Consequently, the swings and roundabouts principle 
consequently applied. Adopting the reasoning of Trollip JA in 
Ranger v Wykerd that the agreed purchase price of the property 
was prima facie the actual market value of the property in its 
represented condition, the court explained that the result would 
be the same in this alternative. 
Consequently, the court awarded the plaintiff R 115000. 
8. Mayes v Noordhot87 
In Mayes v Noordhof, the plaintiffs purchased certain land from 
the defendant. The defendant had fraudulently non-disclosed that 
a squatter camp was to be erected next to the property. When the 
plaintiffs arrived to take possession of the property they found 
that a squatter camp had been erected next to it. The plaintiffs 
argued that they would not have bought the property had they 
been in 'possession of the information the defendant had 
regarding the housing of squatters in the area and claimed 
damages on the basis of the fraudulent non-disclosure by the 
defendant. 
The court held that the plaintiffs had established a claim for 
damages for misrepresentation or concealment. According to the 
court, the measure for damages varies from case to case. The. 
court qualified the present case as a case of do/us dans as the 
plaintiffs would not have bought at all had they known the truth. 
The court held that, in this case, damages would have to be 
calculated on the basis of the market value. The court measured 
the damages by determining the difference between the market 
value of the property with the squatter camp next to it and the 
87 1992 4 SA 233 
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value thereof without the squatter camp next to it and awarded 
the difference to the plaintiffs. 
9. Evaluation of the case law 
Evaluating the case law, one can say that the only consistency in 
the South African court's decision lies in the fact, that with one 
exception, the delictual measure was regarded as the appropriate 
one in cases where fraudulent misrepresentation induced a 
contract. With regard to the delictual measure, originally two 
approaches could be distinguished: 
a) Approach of the comparison of the two performances 
One approach entails the comparison of the two performances. If 
the misrepresentee received less than he paid, he suffered loss. 
But if he received more or equal to what he paid, he will not have 
suffered any loss and will therefore not be entitled to damages. 
The difference between the purchase price and the real value of 
the merx is therefore the measure of damages88. This approach is 
based on the Appellate Division's decision in the Trotman's 
case89. 
b) Approach of the comparison of the purchase price and the 
putative price 
According to the second approach the question is not whether or 
not the misrepresentee received less than what he paid, but how 
much more he was induced to pay by reason of the delict. In this 
respect, the misrepresentee's out-of-pocket loss is the difference 
between the purchase price and the putative price, namely the 
88 De Jager v Grunder 1964 1 SA 446 (A) 
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price they would have agreed upon in the absence of fraud. This 
approach is based on the decision in the Bill Harvey case90. 
c) Further development 
As the facts of each case differed, South African courts have 
been generally reluctant to use one rigid formula. Moreover, none 
of the above approaches prevented inequitable results when 
applied strictly: 
The first approach has the disadvantage that, in most cases, this 
approach is to the plaintiff's detriment because he may fail to 
prove that what he received was less than what he performed. 
This approach further favours the wrongdoer as it does not take 
into account the benefit of the bargain. 
The second approach can be unfavourable to the plaintiff as it is 
not enough for the buyer simply to aver how much he would have 
agreed upon to pay. He must also prove that the other party 
would have accepted that offer91 . 
Courts have therefore tried to improve on the above approaches 
and to find a practical way to measure the damages equitably: 
(1) distinction between do/us dans and do/us incedens without prove 
of acceptance 
The view that a distinction has to be drawn between do/us dans 
and do/us incedens first expressed by the majority in the De Jager 
case . Only in cases of dolus dans may the comparison of the 
89 see Trotman v Edvick 1 951 1 SA 443 
90 see Bill Harvey v Orangezicht Citrus Estates (A) 1958 (1) SA 579 (A) 
91 De Jager v Grunder 1964 1 SA 446 (A) 
l. 
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performance an counter-performance, as used in the first 
approach, be the appropriate measure. 
In cases of do/us incedens, the measure of damages is the 
difference between the actual price paid and the putative price 
paid in the absence of fraud. The party misled does not have to 
prove that the other party would have agreed on the putative 
price92 . 
This approach has been criticised for ignoring an important and 
self evident requirement. Before do/us incedens can be claimed a 
person also has to prove that were it not for the fraud, the 
defendant would be prepared to contract on the terms on which 
the defrauded party would be prepared to contract. 
It has been further argued that the view that damages for delict 
and those for breach of contract may coincide is based on no 
authority93. 
- (2) fiction of the physical damage after t-he contract or use of factual 
assumptions 
A completely new approach was expressed by Trollip JA in the 
Ranger case. This was where the "swings- and roundabouts 
principle" does not apply, damages can be assessed according to 
the principles applicable in cases of physical damage to property. 
92 this was not stated expressly but the majority completely ignored this 
requirement. Otherwise the court not possibly have decided in favour of the 
plaintiff who did not prove that the defendant in the absence of fraud would have 
agreed to the same terms. 
93 Dlamini, p 360 
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In cases where it is not clear whether or not the "swings- and 
roundabouts principle" applies, factual assumptions can be used 
to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding his damage. 
This approach has been criticised for offering little assistance, 
because it does not address the applicability or inapplicability of 
the swings- and roundabouts-principle. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the use of factual assumptions creates uncertainty in 
law. 
(3) apply the contractual measure 
Additionally there is also the view of Jansen JA in the Ranger 
case that it is preferable for policy considerations to use a 
contractual measure of damages as this would be in conformity 
with past practice. 
This approach has not found favour, because the court felt that 
the plaintiff would be assisted without sacrifice of principle. The 
contractual measure belongs to the realm of breach of contract, 
not of delict, to which the action for fraud inducing a contract 
belongs. Furthermore, it has been argued that· the fact that an 
award of damages in terms of delictual negative interesse may 
sometimes have the same result does not justify the conclusion 
that an incorrect measure of damages has been used94. 
(4) practical approach: onus of rebuttal for defendant 
94 Dlamini at p. 344 
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Another approach is the practical one laid down in the case of 
Colt Motors. According to this, the plaintiff has to allege only what 
he would have ben prepared to pay, what he actually performed 
as a result of the misrepresentation and that he has suffered 
damage in the amount of the difference between the actual and 
putative performances. If these allegations are supported by 
evidence, the defendant bears the onus of rebuttal to show that 
he would not have accepted such putative performance. 
(5) Compensation on a broad basis 
Finally, there is the view expressed in Hunt v Westhuizen that the 
deterrence of fraud in commercial relations is more likely to be 
achieved by a policy of compelling fraudulent wrongdoers to 
compensate their victims on a broad basis. According to this view 
any gain and benefit which has inured to the plaintiff as a result of 
the contract should in all cases be treated as res inter alias acta 
vis a' vis the wrongdoer and should not figure in the assessment 
of damages95. 
d) Approaches developed by commentators 
In considering the courts decisions, SouthAfrican commentators 
have developed different approaches: 
(1) apply the delictual measure and distinguish between do/us dans 
and do/us incedens with prove of acceptance 
95 see Hunt v Vander Westhuizen 1990 (3) SA 357 at p. 362 
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Visser and Potgieter96 and Erasmus and Gauntlett97 are all of the 
opinion that a distinction has to be drawn between instances 
where the fraudulent misrepresentation has, in fact, induced the 
contract (do/us dans in contractum) and instances where the 
misrepresentee would in any event have entered into that 
agreement but on terms more favourable to himself (do/us 
incedens in contractum). 
(a) do/us dans 
These authorities suggest that where fraud is in the form of do/us 
dans, damages are to be calculated by determining the position in 
which the misrepresentee would have been in without a contract. 
Accordingly, the value of the misrepresentee's performance must 
be weighed against that of the misrepresenter. In this case, the 
measure of the misrepresentee, s damage is restricted to this 
difference. If there is no difference then the misrepresentee has 
suffered no loss and no action lies98 . 
(b) do/us incedens. 
In cases where fraud is in the form of do/us incedens, these 
authors suggest that the measure of damages is the difference 
between the price actually paid and the price the misrepresentee 
would have paid and the defendant who made the 
misrepresentation would have accepted, had 
misrepresentation not been made. 
(c) Criticism of distinction between causal and incidental fraud: 
96 Visser, Potgieter, Law of Damages; at. p. 336 
97 Erasmus & Gauntlett, The Law of South Africa, Vol. 7 at. p 53 
98 Erasmus & Gauntlett, The Law of South Africa, Vol. 7 at. p 53 
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The distinction 'between causal fraud and incidental fraud has 
been criticised for being artificial and leading to confusion. It has 
further been said that it is of little value, because if the deceived 
party argues that he would have contracted but on different terms, 
it will be extremely unlikely, that in the event of incidental fraud 
the deceiver would agree that he would have contracted on terms 
less favourable to him99. The very fact that the defendant 
committed fraud is sufficient evidence that he wanted the 
maximum benefit from the transaction. If there is no agreement as 
to the putative price, then the market value will be regarded as 
the putative price. In this event the situation is the same as if the 
deceived party had contended that there would have been no 
contract at all. Dlamini is therefore of the opinion that the 
distinction between do/us incedens and do/us dans is obsolete 100. 
(2) Apply the delictual measure and do not distinguish between do/us 
dans and do/us incedens 
Other authors 101 deny the relevance of the distinction between 
do/us dans and do/us incedens, submitting that the damages 
awarded a plaintiff should place him in the position h_e would have 
occupied if he had not entered into a contract. According to this 
view, the only approach which would lead to the effective 
application of the delictual measure is the weighing up of the 
counterperformances 102• 
Despite the fact that this view serves legal certainty, the rigid 
application of the rule of weighing up the counter performances 
can lead to inequitable results. Furthermore, it has been said that 
99 Dlamini, p 361 
100 Dlamini, p 361 
101 Van der Merwe & Oliver 320; Dlamini 1985 De Jure, 347-348; 
102 Dlamini, at p. 367 
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the renunciation of the distinction between do/us dans and do/us 
incedens is contrary to reality103. 
(3) Damages for fraudulent misrepresentation do not include loss of 
profit 
Moreover, there is an opinion 104 that delictual damages are only 
based on loss which has actually been sustained. According to 
this opinion, damages for loss of profit are excluded. This has the 
consequence that where a person shows a profit he suffers no 
loss, since the deprivation of his opportunity to make a larger 
profit is irrelevant. 
This view has been criticised for being untenable since it is based 
of incorrect views of positive and negative interesse as a measure 
of damages 105. 
( 4) physical damage after the contract analogy 
\ 
Cameron 106 finally suggests that the "physical damage after the 
contract" analogy adopted by the majority of the court in Rangers 
v Wykerd should be used as this approach will prevent the court 
from being incorrectly influenced by the accidental fact that a 
delict has been committed in a contractual context. 
Criticism of this approach is that it offers little assistance, 
because it does not address the applicability of the "swings and 
roundabouts" principle. Furthermore it ignores the fact that in 
103 Visser & Potgieter at p 343 
104 Van der Merwe & Oliver 324-325 
105 see Visser & Potgieter, at p. 343 
106 1982 SALJ 113-114 
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cases of physical damage the plaintiff has not received anything 
from the wrongdoer while in the case of inducing a contract, the 
misled party has received something. Accordingly, this approach 
offers no answer to the question whether the party's 
performances should be taken into account or not. 
Obviously none of the above approaches is free of criticism as 
there are difficulties inherent in all. It this therefore difficult to 
answer the question of which approach should be followed. In 
order to identify the most favourable approach a brief look at the 
German solution to the problem in question may be helpful. 
10. German position 
As under SouthAfrican law under German law the misrepresentee 
is in cases of intentional misrepresentation entitled to cancel or 
uphold the contract. One instrument to cancel the contract is the 
declaration of avoidance (Anfechtungserklarung, § 142 8GB). If 
an intentional misrepresentation (arg/igstige Tauschung, § 123 
8GB) gives legal reason for a declaration of avoidance, the 
declaration effects the nullity of the contract ex tune. 
If the misrepresentee declares the contract avoided he can claim 
back the money paid according to the principles of unjust 
enrichment(§ 812 8GB). 
Furthermore, the misrepresentee can claim restitution on 
grounds of the institute of culpa in contrahendo. This claim 
contains all costs necessary to place the misrepresentee in the 
position he was in before the conclusion of the contract. The loss 
incurred by relying on the misrepresentor's declaration must also 
be compensated. 
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Additionally, the misrepresentee is entitled to claim damages in 
delict (vorsatzliche sittenwidrige Schadigung, § 826 8GB). If the 
misrepresentee has cancelled the contract, this claim is limited to 
the negative interesse. The misrepresentee can claim to be put in 
the position he would have been in had the misrepresentation not 
incurred. This claim includes the reimbursement of the 
misrepresentee's performance, restitution for any special costs 
incurred, and any damage suffered due to the rejection of another 
offer. 
If the misrepresentee proves that, in the absence of the 
misrepresentation a contract actually would have been concluded 
on better terms, he can claim this difference in price. The 
misrepresentee however, cannot claim the difference between the 
price actually paid and the price the misrepresentee would have 
paid without proving that the misrepresentor would have accepted 
the reduced offer 1°7. 
German courts have created an exception from this rule in cases 
where the misrepresentee would not have concluded the contract 
in the absence of the misrepresentation but decides not to cancel 
the contract for special reasons. One examples of these special 
reasons is where it is not possible to return the purchased item. In 
these cases, the misrepresentee has to be treated as if he has 
concluded the contract on better terms, regardless whether the 
misrepresenter would have accepted these terms or not 1°8. 
Aclaim including the positive interesse can only be brought up as 
a contractual claim resulting if § 463 8GB. This Article provides 
~ 
that the purchaser can claim damages for non-performance in 
107 Mertens, Mi.inchener Kommentar, § 826 Rdnr. 69 
108 see BGH NJW 1997, 1536 
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cases of fraudulent misrepresentation. Accordingly the purchaser 
must be placed in the position he would have had had the 
purchased item indeed the required quality. This claim includes 
the consequential loss caused adequately. The purchaser has the 
choice of keeping or returning the purchased item. If he keeps it, 
his damages are measured by taking the difference in price of the 
purchased item and the . corresponding item of the promised 
quality. If the purchaser returns the purchased item, he can claim 
the purchase price, the costs of the contract, and all 
consequential loss caused adequately by the misrepresentation. 
To summarise the German position, one can state that generally 
German courts strictly apply the delictual measure. Although the 
terms do/us dans and do/us incedens have no meaning in German 
law, German courts are aware of the different consequences that 
causal and incidental fraud may have. While in cases of do/us 
dans the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant would 
have accepted the putative offer in cases of do/us incedens this 
proof is essential when claiming the difference between the price 
actually paid and the putative price the misrepresentee would 
have paid in absence of a misrepresentation. 
11. What approach should be adopted ? 
In my opinion, it is questionable whether awarding delictual 
damages to virtually the same extent as damages for the breach 
of contract is desirable. One argument in support of the extension 
of the delictual liability is that it is anomalous that a person guilty 
of wilful fraud should suffer less than one who merely breaches a 
contract109. Countering this argument, one can claim that the 
question to consider is not whether a person guilty of wilful fraud 
should suffer more or less than a person who breaches a contract 
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but to find and apply the correct measure of damages which serve 
the aims of justice, equity and legal certainty. This follows from 
the legal concept that the punishment of a person who has 
committed a wrong is ruled by criminal law. Accordingly, the use 
of private law to punish is not acceptable 110. It is therefore not 
anomalous but a matter of fact that a person guilty of wilful fraud 
has to compensate the victim in a way different from a person 
who breaches a contract. 
From the above discussion of the South African cases, there is no 
doubt that the South-African courts consider the delictual 
measure as the correct measure in cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Because South African courts are cauttious 
about the implications that could arise from strict application of 
the delictual measure and weighing up of the counter 
performances, these courts have tried to work out a policy-
oriented approach to avoid favouring the wrongdoer. Such a 
policy-oriented approach is, however, not desirable as difficulties 
arise over when applying it appropriate. This approach does 
therefore not serve the aim of legal certainty. 
It is furthermore questionable whether the policy of not favouring 
the wrongdoer, and therefore extending the scope of delictual 
liability, is in harmony with the general concept of private law. 
One principle of private law is that where a misrepresentation has 
become a warranty, an action on the contract for breach of 
warranty will award the plaintiff damages representing the benefit 
of the bargain. In cases where a misrepresentation has not 
become a warranty should a plaintiff also be able to claim the 
benefit of the bargain on grounds of a claim based on delict ? If 
this is so, the well settled principle of the law of contract would be 
109 see Jansen JA in 1977 (2) SA 976 at 990 
110 see Dlamini at p 360 
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superfluous. My view is that is seems reasonable that in a case 
where a misrepresentation has become a warranty, the plaintiff is 
allowed to claim the positive interesse as the fact the 
misrepresentation has become a warranty proves that the 
misrepresented fact was of importance to the plaintiff. 
On the other hand it does not appear inequitable not to award the 
plaintiff the benefit of the bargain where the misrepresented fact 
has not become a warranty because this proves that this fact was 
not of essential importance to the plaintiff. In this case, the 
plaintiff is still able to claim his out-of-pocket loss and will 
therefore not suffer damage in its delictual sense. The plaintiff 
also has the possibility of cancelling the contract, which will put 
him in the position he was in before the conclusion of the 
contract. 
I therefore conclude that the aims of justice, equity and legal 
certainty are best served by strictly applying the delictual 
measure. The only approach which would lead to the effective 
application of the delictual measure, is in my opinion the 
approach of the weighing up of the counterperformances. Where 
the plaintiff alleges incidental fraud and is able to prove that the 
defendant would have contracted on terms less favourable to him, 
damages may be measured by taking the difference between the 
actual price paid and the putative price paid in the absence of 
fraud. However, as in most cases this prove will be not be 
possible, this measurement is not in my view of great practical 
importance. 
B. Conclusion 
The above discussion has shown that the sum-formula approach 
is the starting point for the assessment of damages in both legal 
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systems. This formula leads to the consequence that the plaintiff 
be awarded the diminution in the value of his property that the 
delict has brought about. In cases of damage to property, this 
diminution is usually measured by subtracting the post-accident 
market value of the property from its pre-accident market value. 
The reasonable costs of repairs may be taken into account in 
assessing damages where the pre-damage value is established, 
but tne plaintiff fails to prove the post-damage value. The costs of 
repairs are only the appropriate measure, where the plaintiff 
proves that the repairs where necessary, fair and reasonable. 
In cases of loss of use of property, German courts have awarded 
damages even in cases where the plaintiff has not hired a 
substitute. These decisions extend the scope of liability 
unreasonably wide. Damages for loss of use should only be 
awarded where the owner has suffered patrimonial loss. This may 
occur either in form of loss of profit or the reasonable costs 
incurred by hiring a substitute. Where a substitute was not hired 
to mitigate loss of profit, damages should only be awarded where 
the owner shows that he reasonably desired to use the res. 
In cases where fraudulent misrepresentation induces a contract 
South-African courts have awarded delictual damages virtually to 
the same extent as damages for breach of contract. This is not 
desirable as the delictual and not the contractual measure is the 
right measure in these cases. The only approach which leads to 
the effective application of the delictual measure is the approach 
of weighing up the counter performances. This approach should 
be exclusively applied in cases where fraudulent 
misrepresentation induces a contract in order to serve the aims of 
justice, equity and legal certainty. 
